I think this idea is very interesting. If I get you right you say that utilitarianism is for two kinds of people: People who lack moral feelings and people who want to justify the moral feelings they have and find no better justification. It all sounds very plausible.
When someone says that there was a study with "autistic" people I get a bit tired, because autistic meant very different things in different time. The average autistic person born in the 1950s is very different from the average autistic person born in the 2000s. The day when psychological research replaces "an ASD diagnosis" with something more scientific and consistent will be a big day for psychology.
"To me, this is the real argument against utilitarianism. It isn’t that utilitarians are autistic, or that they lack moral feelings, but rather that there is no way to substantiate utilitarianism logically or empirically. Even I don’t know many truly amoral utilitarians, but I do bump into a lot of self-rationalists who want to be “Less Wrong,” and then whatever, just believe whatever they want and cobble together the explanation afterwards. If you call yourself a rationalist, and then find yourself you are concerned with moral systems matching your intuitions, just remember, this is the same reason George W. Bush felt sustained by the prayers of his supporters: “I just feel it.” "
What you have noted here, and by noting it you have noticed more… is I what call this the world-building urge. Everyone empathic world-builds except narcissists and psychopaths, who are the world and are perfect as they are. (this is the notice that should reframe after the notice you have written above)(neo-Pyrrhonism is not far away) Worldbuilding urge does not care what the outcome is, much the same way hunger does not care what you eat, and definitely not recipe you use to make a meal you share with others, even with the 'W'.
The first study you cite is irrelevant because it's looking at autistic traits within a group that is already diagnosed with ASD. The interpretation of that isn't straight-forward at all. The second study is interesting, but it doesn't invalidate the literature that already exists (which I cited in my essay) showing increased consequentialism associated with autism. Regardless, we need more research before any firm conclusions can be made.
Perhaps the reason utilitarianism is to many more appealing than moral nihilism as you describe it is that utilitarianism is universally applicable; in theory, I can behave in a way that is consistent with utilitarianism and I can ask that other people also behave in that way. My moral intuition, by comparison, may be completely different from that of my neighbor, or someone living on another continent. Encouraging other people to follow their moral intuitions (or other intuitions) has the potential to directly contradict mine. Because moral nihilists rely more overtly on intuition, moral nihilism can answer the question, ‘what should I do?’ but cannot answer the question, ‘what should we do?’ In this way, utilitarianism (though flawed) offers a sort of social contract that moral nihilism cannot.
I world-build in whimsy, fair.
I think this idea is very interesting. If I get you right you say that utilitarianism is for two kinds of people: People who lack moral feelings and people who want to justify the moral feelings they have and find no better justification. It all sounds very plausible.
When someone says that there was a study with "autistic" people I get a bit tired, because autistic meant very different things in different time. The average autistic person born in the 1950s is very different from the average autistic person born in the 2000s. The day when psychological research replaces "an ASD diagnosis" with something more scientific and consistent will be a big day for psychology.
"To me, this is the real argument against utilitarianism. It isn’t that utilitarians are autistic, or that they lack moral feelings, but rather that there is no way to substantiate utilitarianism logically or empirically. Even I don’t know many truly amoral utilitarians, but I do bump into a lot of self-rationalists who want to be “Less Wrong,” and then whatever, just believe whatever they want and cobble together the explanation afterwards. If you call yourself a rationalist, and then find yourself you are concerned with moral systems matching your intuitions, just remember, this is the same reason George W. Bush felt sustained by the prayers of his supporters: “I just feel it.” "
What you have noted here, and by noting it you have noticed more… is I what call this the world-building urge. Everyone empathic world-builds except narcissists and psychopaths, who are the world and are perfect as they are. (this is the notice that should reframe after the notice you have written above)(neo-Pyrrhonism is not far away) Worldbuilding urge does not care what the outcome is, much the same way hunger does not care what you eat, and definitely not recipe you use to make a meal you share with others, even with the 'W'.
The first study you cite is irrelevant because it's looking at autistic traits within a group that is already diagnosed with ASD. The interpretation of that isn't straight-forward at all. The second study is interesting, but it doesn't invalidate the literature that already exists (which I cited in my essay) showing increased consequentialism associated with autism. Regardless, we need more research before any firm conclusions can be made.
Perhaps the reason utilitarianism is to many more appealing than moral nihilism as you describe it is that utilitarianism is universally applicable; in theory, I can behave in a way that is consistent with utilitarianism and I can ask that other people also behave in that way. My moral intuition, by comparison, may be completely different from that of my neighbor, or someone living on another continent. Encouraging other people to follow their moral intuitions (or other intuitions) has the potential to directly contradict mine. Because moral nihilists rely more overtly on intuition, moral nihilism can answer the question, ‘what should I do?’ but cannot answer the question, ‘what should we do?’ In this way, utilitarianism (though flawed) offers a sort of social contract that moral nihilism cannot.