I can only compare your experience with that of Anders last spring when I was knocked out for two months. I spent my days in a corner in the periphery of the house. Anders took care of everything. And strangely enough, he became a lot happier and visibly less stressed compared to when I was able-bodied. During the winter before, he had been overworked and grumpy. When I just collapsed and had to leave everything to him, he suddenly seemed to feel fine.
I guess the conclusion must be that different wives are of different use.
No. He is also usually more into housework than me. That might explain things. Still, I was surprised to learn that my attempts at getting things done are that annoying.
My hat is off to parents, particularly those who step up to the plate and take an honest swing at it. Civilization's unsung heroes and heroines. 👍🙂
But consciousness is definitely a puzzle. One of the better books I've read on the topic, of several, is David Chalmer's "The Conscious Mind". Couple of insightful and amusing quips from the 20 pages of notes I made on it some 13 years ago:
DC: "Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe. ....
The International Dictionary of Psychology does not even try to give a straightforward characterization:
'Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-consciousness – to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it. (Sutherland 1989)' [pg. 3] ....
I have advocated some counterintuitive views in this work. I resisted mind-body dualism for a long time, but I have now come to the point where I accept it, not just as the only tenable view but as a satisfying view in its own right. It is always possible that I am confused, or that there is a new and radical possibility that I have overlooked; but I can comfortably say that I think dualism is very likely true. I have also raised the possibility of a kind of panpsychism. Like mind-body dualism, this is initially counterintuitive, but the counterintuitiveness disappears with time. I am unsure whether the view is true or false, but it is at least intellectually appealing, and on reflection it is not too crazy to be acceptable."
I likewise find the "mind-body dualism" the more plausible argument -- consciousness as a process rather than a thing.
But ICYMI, you might find it particularly interesting given Chalmer's forays into quantum mechanics.
I haven't had time for a better constructed reply (I keep getting interrupted even writing this comment), but I've read over this a couple of times, now. Though I'm definitely not a dualist, I definitely appreciate the way he writes about this.
Thanks -- hope your wife gets well soon. Though maybe she appreciates the change of pace. 🙂
But a fascinating book, highly recommended. Of particular note is his emphasis on the dichotomy between structure and dynamics -- probably the basis, in part at least, for his sympathy for mind-body dualism. Quite a bit of justification to argue that consciousness is a process, not just a thing. Our bodies still exist once we die but our consciousness has, presumably, "evaporated" -- whence "mind-body dualism".
But a fairly solid idea with a venerable provenance:
Specifically, is the idea of something being a process essentially that part of its structure is temporal rather than spatial? For instance, the behavior of a metronome can be represented spatially by a sine curve, or in phase space (i.e. a velocity vs position graph) as a circle.
Not sure that one can say that "process is part of structure" -- the former is the antithesis of the latter. Where has the process gone when one stops a metronome? Is it any lighter as a result?
As Chalmers emphasized, structure and dynamics are entirely different kettles of fish, though he also argues or suggests that consciousness "exists" beyond both of those:
DC: "Any account [of consciousness] given in purely physical terms will suffer from the same problem. It will ultimately be given in terms of the structural and dynamical properties of physical processes, and no matter how sophisticated such an account is, it will yield only more structure and dynamics. While this is enough to handle most natural phenomena, the problem of consciousness goes beyond any problem about the explanation of structure and function, so a new sort of explanation is needed." [pg. 121]
Interestingly, he conjectures, not entirely in jest, that consciousness may qualify as a fundamental entity like mass and charge.
But a complex issue and phenomenon that maybe language is somewhat inadequate to encapsulate or describe -- Gödel's proof and all that. And one I certainly don't know all the ins and outs of, even of what has been written on the topic. But you might take a gander at that Wikipedia article, particularly these quotes from physicist Ilya Prigogine:
Wikipedia: "In physics, Ilya Prigogine[3] distinguishes between the 'physics of being' and the 'physics of becoming'. Process philosophy covers not just scientific intuitions and experiences, but can be used as a conceptual bridge to facilitate discussions among religion, philosophy, and science."
Structure is "being", whereas processes -- and, arguably, consciousness -- is "becoming", is a continual transition from existing as one structure to existing as other ones.
I looked through the Wikipedia article, and I'm still not sure what you mean.
> Not sure that one can say that "process is part of structure" -- the former is the antithesis of the latter.
But I'm asking, is the idea of something being a process essentially that part of its structure is temporal rather than spatial? Substitute "nature" or "essence" for structure in that sentence if you like. You say "a metronome manifests a process;" I can represent a metranome in phase space with a circle, winding forever upon itself. Does this accurately represent what you think of as the process of a ticking metronome?
Seems to me that you're trying to say that "things" that change from moment to moment have a structure that does NOT change from moment to moment. You might just as well say black is white. Or that a musical note weighs 10 pounds -- a category error.
Process is, more or less by definition, a change in structure, over some period of time, in the relationships between physical bits and pieces of "stuff". Rather hard to see how that process can possibly qualify as a structure. Certainly nothing like the structure of, say, some large protein molecule.
Sure, you can describe, can "represent" a metronome as a sinusoidally varying function of time. But that representation isn't the process itself. Much less any "consciousness" that the metronome itself "might" "experience" -- and I emphasize both words.
Analogously, you experience, are aware of, can describe your kids growing taller and developing various traits typical of their sexes. But your description is not their consciousness. Because it is only they who experience whatever process undergirds that phenomenon.
The argument is that continuity, the "awareness" of "some" process over some period of time is THE essence of consciousness. The question then is WHAT process? How do some processes, presumably, give rise to consciousness and some, presumably, don't?
You may wish to try reading that book of Chalmers as he generally does a far better job of explaining those ideas than I can possibly do, particularly in a short comment. But a couple of quotes gleaned from my notes may give a flavour of where he's coming from:
DC: "I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible, and I even argue for a form of dualism. …. Even after we have explained the physical and computational functioning of a conscious system, we still need to explain why the system has conscious experiences. …. Unfortunately, the kind of functional explanation that works so well for psychological states does not seem to work in explaining phenomenal states. The reason for this is straightforward. Whatever functional account of human cognition we give, there is a further question: Why is this kind of functioning accompanied by consciousness? …. Although conscious states may play various causal roles, they are not defined by their causal roles. Rather, what makes them conscious is that they have a certain phenomenal feel, and this feel is not something that can be functionally defined away. …. No set of facts about physical structure and dynamics can add up to a fact about phenomenology [consciousness]."
consciousness/intelligence & turing machine debate at pfbid02bWbsGeLGTjYDhtqGhNGShTESPRAB1aGxBaKg4LTNe9Yn3PVxdABKn1tXGWZLAA3Ml
my current updated model onthe question feel that general intelligence doesn't exist, so a moonshot for AGI is potentially a category error,
I can only compare your experience with that of Anders last spring when I was knocked out for two months. I spent my days in a corner in the periphery of the house. Anders took care of everything. And strangely enough, he became a lot happier and visibly less stressed compared to when I was able-bodied. During the winter before, he had been overworked and grumpy. When I just collapsed and had to leave everything to him, he suddenly seemed to feel fine.
I guess the conclusion must be that different wives are of different use.
Does Anders have another job?
(Weirdly it tried to post this three times)
No. He is also usually more into housework than me. That might explain things. Still, I was surprised to learn that my attempts at getting things done are that annoying.
Anders is lucky! I dislike housework, and I *intensely* dislike interruptions.
My hat is off to parents, particularly those who step up to the plate and take an honest swing at it. Civilization's unsung heroes and heroines. 👍🙂
But consciousness is definitely a puzzle. One of the better books I've read on the topic, of several, is David Chalmer's "The Conscious Mind". Couple of insightful and amusing quips from the 20 pages of notes I made on it some 13 years ago:
DC: "Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe. ....
The International Dictionary of Psychology does not even try to give a straightforward characterization:
'Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-consciousness – to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it. (Sutherland 1989)' [pg. 3] ....
I have advocated some counterintuitive views in this work. I resisted mind-body dualism for a long time, but I have now come to the point where I accept it, not just as the only tenable view but as a satisfying view in its own right. It is always possible that I am confused, or that there is a new and radical possibility that I have overlooked; but I can comfortably say that I think dualism is very likely true. I have also raised the possibility of a kind of panpsychism. Like mind-body dualism, this is initially counterintuitive, but the counterintuitiveness disappears with time. I am unsure whether the view is true or false, but it is at least intellectually appealing, and on reflection it is not too crazy to be acceptable."
I likewise find the "mind-body dualism" the more plausible argument -- consciousness as a process rather than a thing.
But ICYMI, you might find it particularly interesting given Chalmer's forays into quantum mechanics.
I haven't had time for a better constructed reply (I keep getting interrupted even writing this comment), but I've read over this a couple of times, now. Though I'm definitely not a dualist, I definitely appreciate the way he writes about this.
Thanks -- hope your wife gets well soon. Though maybe she appreciates the change of pace. 🙂
But a fascinating book, highly recommended. Of particular note is his emphasis on the dichotomy between structure and dynamics -- probably the basis, in part at least, for his sympathy for mind-body dualism. Quite a bit of justification to argue that consciousness is a process, not just a thing. Our bodies still exist once we die but our consciousness has, presumably, "evaporated" -- whence "mind-body dualism".
But a fairly solid idea with a venerable provenance:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process_philosophy
Moot of course as to exactly "what" process "instantiates" consciousness -- a metronome manifests a process: is it thereby conscious?
But if that is the case then maybe we could transfer our consciousness into something more durable than we "meat puppets"? 😉🙂
I'd like to understand what you mean better.
Specifically, is the idea of something being a process essentially that part of its structure is temporal rather than spatial? For instance, the behavior of a metronome can be represented spatially by a sine curve, or in phase space (i.e. a velocity vs position graph) as a circle.
Not sure that one can say that "process is part of structure" -- the former is the antithesis of the latter. Where has the process gone when one stops a metronome? Is it any lighter as a result?
As Chalmers emphasized, structure and dynamics are entirely different kettles of fish, though he also argues or suggests that consciousness "exists" beyond both of those:
DC: "Any account [of consciousness] given in purely physical terms will suffer from the same problem. It will ultimately be given in terms of the structural and dynamical properties of physical processes, and no matter how sophisticated such an account is, it will yield only more structure and dynamics. While this is enough to handle most natural phenomena, the problem of consciousness goes beyond any problem about the explanation of structure and function, so a new sort of explanation is needed." [pg. 121]
Interestingly, he conjectures, not entirely in jest, that consciousness may qualify as a fundamental entity like mass and charge.
But a complex issue and phenomenon that maybe language is somewhat inadequate to encapsulate or describe -- Gödel's proof and all that. And one I certainly don't know all the ins and outs of, even of what has been written on the topic. But you might take a gander at that Wikipedia article, particularly these quotes from physicist Ilya Prigogine:
Wikipedia: "In physics, Ilya Prigogine[3] distinguishes between the 'physics of being' and the 'physics of becoming'. Process philosophy covers not just scientific intuitions and experiences, but can be used as a conceptual bridge to facilitate discussions among religion, philosophy, and science."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process_philosophy
Structure is "being", whereas processes -- and, arguably, consciousness -- is "becoming", is a continual transition from existing as one structure to existing as other ones.
I looked through the Wikipedia article, and I'm still not sure what you mean.
> Not sure that one can say that "process is part of structure" -- the former is the antithesis of the latter.
But I'm asking, is the idea of something being a process essentially that part of its structure is temporal rather than spatial? Substitute "nature" or "essence" for structure in that sentence if you like. You say "a metronome manifests a process;" I can represent a metranome in phase space with a circle, winding forever upon itself. Does this accurately represent what you think of as the process of a ticking metronome?
Seems to me that you're trying to say that "things" that change from moment to moment have a structure that does NOT change from moment to moment. You might just as well say black is white. Or that a musical note weighs 10 pounds -- a category error.
Process is, more or less by definition, a change in structure, over some period of time, in the relationships between physical bits and pieces of "stuff". Rather hard to see how that process can possibly qualify as a structure. Certainly nothing like the structure of, say, some large protein molecule.
Sure, you can describe, can "represent" a metronome as a sinusoidally varying function of time. But that representation isn't the process itself. Much less any "consciousness" that the metronome itself "might" "experience" -- and I emphasize both words.
Analogously, you experience, are aware of, can describe your kids growing taller and developing various traits typical of their sexes. But your description is not their consciousness. Because it is only they who experience whatever process undergirds that phenomenon.
The argument is that continuity, the "awareness" of "some" process over some period of time is THE essence of consciousness. The question then is WHAT process? How do some processes, presumably, give rise to consciousness and some, presumably, don't?
You may wish to try reading that book of Chalmers as he generally does a far better job of explaining those ideas than I can possibly do, particularly in a short comment. But a couple of quotes gleaned from my notes may give a flavour of where he's coming from:
DC: "I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible, and I even argue for a form of dualism. …. Even after we have explained the physical and computational functioning of a conscious system, we still need to explain why the system has conscious experiences. …. Unfortunately, the kind of functional explanation that works so well for psychological states does not seem to work in explaining phenomenal states. The reason for this is straightforward. Whatever functional account of human cognition we give, there is a further question: Why is this kind of functioning accompanied by consciousness? …. Although conscious states may play various causal roles, they are not defined by their causal roles. Rather, what makes them conscious is that they have a certain phenomenal feel, and this feel is not something that can be functionally defined away. …. No set of facts about physical structure and dynamics can add up to a fact about phenomenology [consciousness]."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy)